

OPTIMIZING THE SUPERVISORY FUNCTION OF THE REGIONAL PEOPLE'S REPRESENTATIVE COUNCIL OF MUSI BANYU ASIN REGENCY IN 2025

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Abstract

This study aims to analyze the optimization of the oversight function of the Musi Banyuasin Regency Regional People's Representative Council (DPRD), which in practice still tends to be ceremonial and has not yet addressed the substantive aspects of regional government administration. Effective oversight is a key pillar in realizing good governance, particularly in ensuring executive accountability, transparency, and responsiveness to the public interest. This study uses a qualitative approach with a case study method, allowing researchers to delve deeply into the dynamics of the DPRD's oversight function. Data were collected through in-depth interviews, observations, and a review of relevant official documents, then analyzed using the Good Governance theoretical framework. The results indicate that the effectiveness of the Musi Banyuasin Regency DPRD's oversight function still faces various structural and political obstacles. The main obstacles include low levels of transparency and information disclosure from the executive branch, limited human and institutional capacity within the DPRD, and strong political pragmatism that impacts oversight of independence. Furthermore, this study also identified supporting factors, particularly increasing public pressure and control through the media and civil society, that have encouraged the DPRD to carry out its oversight function more actively. Based on these findings, this study formulates several strategic recommendations focused on strengthening the institutional capacity of the Regional People's Representative Council (DPRD), increasing the use of information technology in the oversight process, and institutionalizing public participation as a partner in oversight. This strategy is expected to encourage a more effective, substantive, and good governance-oriented DPRD oversight function, supporting accountable regional governance by 2025.

Keywords: *DPRD oversight function, good governance, regional governance, public participation, Musi Banyuasin Regency*

INTRODUCTION

The Regional People's Representative Council (DPRD) plays a strategic role in the regional autonomy system as a legislative body. One of its crucial functions is oversight of government administration by the regional executive. This function is a fundamental instrument for realizing good governance, which is based on the principles of accountability, transparency, and participation (Maharani and Fadli 2025). Through effective oversight, the DPRD ensures that every policy and budget utilization is accountable to the public (Amir and Riau nd). Therefore, optimizing the oversight function is a crucial prerequisite for realizing a clean, efficient, and responsive regional government to the needs of the community (Notanubun, Niswaty, and Yulis 2025). Although procedurally, oversight instruments have been implemented, the reality in various regions, including Musi Banyu Asin Regency, shows significant challenges (Hikmat 2019). The implementation of the oversight function is often trapped in ceremonial formalities and fails to address the substance of the problems in depth (Fauzan et al. 2025). Weak monitoring mechanisms for follow-up recommendations, limited data access from the executive branch, and minimal meaningful public participation are key indicators of a suboptimal oversight role (Hariri 2020). This phenomenon creates a gap between the constitutional mandate of the Regional People's Representative Council (DPRD) and its effectiveness in upholding accountability and transparency in regional government. Based on these issues, this study aims to analyze in-depth the factors inhibiting and supporting the effectiveness of the Musi Banyu Asin Regency DPRD's oversight function. Using a theoretical framework of good governance as an analytical tool, this study examines the

implementation of the principles of accountability, transparency, and participation in oversight practices. Through a qualitative case study approach, this research seeks to identify the root causes and formulate concrete and measurable strategic recommendations. The goal is to contribute ideas to optimize the DPRD's oversight function by 2025.

LITERATURE REVIEW

The theoretical framework of this research is based on the theory of Good Governance (Rahman 2023). This theory is a paradigm that emphasizes the process of implementing state power effectively, efficiently, transparently, and accountably (Abdullah et al. 2020). Its main principles include participation, the rule of law, transparency, responsiveness, consensus orientation, equality, effectiveness, and accountability (Hariyanto et al. 2025). This theory provides an ideal benchmark for analyzing and evaluating the performance of government institutions, including the Regional People's Representative Council (DPRD), in carrying out their functions, particularly their oversight of the regional executive (Cahyono 2018). One of the main pillars of good governance theory is the principle of accountability (Tartib and Wahyuni 2023). Accountability refers to the obligation of public officials to be accountable for every action, policy, and use of resources to the communities they serve (Budiada, Sumada, and ... 2024). In this context, the DPRD's oversight function is a fundamental instrument for upholding local government accountability. Optimizing this function directly reflects the level of executive accountability to the legislature and the public, which is an important indicator of the realization of good governance in Musi Banyuasin Regency. The principle of transparency is also a crucial element relevant to the DPRD's oversight function (Mustafa 2017). Transparency requires open information regarding the decision-making process and policy implementation, making it easily accessible to the public (Taibu and Kahar 2025). The DPRD's oversight function will function optimally if supported by transparency from the executive branch, particularly in budget management and development program implementation. This openness allows the DPRD to conduct accurate verification and evaluation, and prevents potential abuse of authority and corruption in regional governance (Kadir, Handoko, and Novaria 2025).

The theory of good governance also emphasizes the importance of public participation in the governance process. Participation ensures that community aspirations and interests are accommodated in every policy. The DPRD's oversight function becomes more acute and relevant when it involves active community participation, whether through public hearings, aspiration absorption, or public complaints. This involvement not only enhances the legitimacy of oversight but also makes it more responsive to the real problems faced by the community in Musi Banyu Asin Regency. The theory of good governance, with its core pillars of accountability, transparency, and public participation, will be used as an analytical tool in this study. This framework will guide the identification of factors that hinder and support the effectiveness of the Musi Banyu Asin Regency Regional People's Representative Council's (DPRD) oversight function. Based on this analysis, this study will formulate concrete and measurable strategic recommendations to optimize the DPRD's oversight function by 2025, thus aligning it with the principles of good governance.

METHOD

1. Types and Approaches of Research

This study uses a qualitative research type with a descriptive method[5]. The qualitative approach was chosen because it aims to understand in depth the phenomenon of optimizing the supervisory function of the Musi Banyu Asin Regency DPRD, which cannot be measured quantitatively. The descriptive method is used to present a systematic, factual, and accurate picture of the facts and relationships between the phenomena studied. Through this method, researchers can explore the complexity of the supervisory process, identify inhibiting and supporting factors, and analyze the perceptions of the actors involved, thus producing a holistic and contextual understanding of the issues studied.

The approach used in this research is a case study[4]. This approach was chosen to allow for an intensive and in-depth investigation of a single social unit, namely the oversight function of the Musi Banyu Asin Regency DPRD in the relevant time period leading up to 2025. The case study allows researchers to explore the internal dynamics of the institution, interactions with the executive government, and community involvement in the oversight process. By limiting the focus to one specific case, this research can produce a comprehensive understanding of the challenges and opportunities in optimization efforts, which forms the basis for formulating strategic recommendations. The combination of descriptive qualitative research and a case study approach was deemed most relevant to addressing the research problem. This approach allows researchers to not only describe what occurs in the oversight function but also understand why and how the process occurs. This aligns with the theoretical framework of good governance used as an analytical tool, where principles such as accountability,

transparency, and participation require in-depth analysis within the context of real-world practice. Thus, this method facilitates the collection of rich data to evaluate the implementation of these principles.

2. Location and Time of Research

This research will be conducted in Musi Banyu Asin Regency, South Sumatra Province. The location was chosen based on the strategic relevance of the Musi Banyu Asin Regency Regional People's Representative Council (DPRD) in the context of implementing regional autonomy and the dynamics of oversight of executive policies. As a legislative body in a region with significant natural resources, the DPRD's oversight function is crucial to ensuring accountability and transparency in budget management and development programs. The main focus of the research will be centered on the Musi Banyu Asin Regency DPRD Building, which serves as the center of legislative, budgeting, and oversight activities, as well as several other relevant regional government agency offices. Specifically, the research location will concentrate on several key points that represent the oversight process. The primary location is the Musi Banyu Asin Regency DPRD Building, which includes the office space of the council leadership, commissions relevant to the oversight field (e.g., Commission I for governance and law, and Commission II for economics and finance), and the DPRD Secretariat, which acts as a support system. Secondary locations include the Musi Banyu Asin Regent's Office and several Regional Work Units (SKPD) that are the main objects of oversight, such as the Public Works and Spatial Planning Agency and the Regional Financial and Asset Management Agency.

3. Data Sources and Data Collection Techniques

The data sources in this study consist of primary and secondary data. Primary data were obtained directly from informants selected through purposive sampling[6], namely individuals who are considered to have in-depth knowledge and experience related to the DPRD's oversight function. Key informants include DPRD leaders, commission heads, and members of the Budget Agency. Meanwhile, supporting informants come from executive parties such as the Regional Secretary, heads of relevant SKPDs, as well as representatives from academics and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) who actively observe regional governance. Secondary data were collected from official documents such as the Regent's Accountability Report (LKPJ)[8], meeting minutes, and regional legal products.

The primary data collection technique used is in-depth interviews. The interviews will be conducted in a semi-structured manner using a flexible interview guide to allow researchers to explore information more deeply and comprehensively. The purpose of these interviews is to gain an in-depth understanding of the informants' perceptions, experiences, and perspectives on the implementation of the supervisory function, the inhibiting and supporting factors, and strategic ideas for optimization. The entire interview process will be recorded using an audio recorder with the informants' permission and supported by field notes to ensure the accuracy and completeness of the collected data.

To complement the interview data, the researchers also used non-participant observation and documentation studies. Observations were conducted by directly observing the dynamics of working meetings, hearings, and plenary sessions at the Musi Banyu Asin Regency Regional People's Representative Council (DPRD). This technique aimed to capture interactions, decision-making processes, and the implementation of oversight functions factually in the field. Meanwhile, documentation studies were conducted by analyzing relevant documents to verify and enrich the findings from the interviews and observations. The combination of these three techniques (triangulation) was used to increase the validity and reliability of the research data.

4. Research Instruments

The primary instrument in this qualitative research is the researcher themselves (human instrument), whose role is crucial throughout the data collection and interpretation process. The researcher's ability to build rapport with informants, ask in-depth questions, and capture non-verbal nuances during interviews and observations is key to success. To support this role, the researcher is equipped with a range of supporting instruments. However, the researcher's flexibility and sensitivity in responding to field dynamics are indispensable for understanding the complexity of the Musi Banyu Asin Regency DPRD's oversight function holistically and in-depth.

The first supporting instrument was a semi-structured interview guide designed to gather data from informants. This guide contained a list of open-ended questions compiled based on indicators of good governance theory, covering aspects of accountability, transparency, and participation in the oversight function. These questions covered perceptions of the effectiveness of current oversight, identification of inhibiting and supporting factors, and exploration of ideas for optimization strategies. Its semi-structured nature provided researchers with the flexibility to probe and follow up on informants' responses, thus enabling the discovery of new, unexpected findings beyond the framework of the initial questions.

In addition to the interview guide, this study also utilized an observation checklist and a documentation study guide. The observation checklist was used when observing DPRD meetings to systematically record the dynamics of interactions, the substance of discussions, the level of criticality of council members, and the follow-up mechanisms for monitoring results. Meanwhile, the documentation study guide listed relevant documents for analysis, such as the LKPJ (Regional Financial Statements), meeting minutes, and audit reports. The use of these two instruments aimed to triangulate data, verify information obtained from interviews, and strengthen the validity of the research findings.

5. Data Analysis Techniques

Data analysis in this study will use an interactive model developed by Miles, Huberman, and Saldana[10]. This analysis process consists of three simultaneous activity streams: data reduction, data presentation, and conclusion drawing/verification. Data reduction is carried out by summarizing, selecting, and focusing raw data from interviews, observations, and documentation relevant to optimizing the supervisory function. Next, the reduced data is presented in narrative form, matrices, or charts to facilitate understanding. The final stage is drawing conclusions that are continuously verified throughout the research to build robust findings.

The data analysis phase begins with the field data collection process. All collected data, including interview transcripts and field notes, undergo a coding process to identify key patterns and themes. This process utilizes a thematic analysis approach, where codes are developed deductively from the theoretical framework of good governance (accountability, transparency, participation) and inductively from emerging data. These codes are then grouped into broader categories to establish relationships between concepts. This process allows researchers to systematically and in-depthly interpret the meaning behind the data.

To ensure the validity and credibility of the findings, this study employed triangulation techniques. Triangulation was conducted by comparing and cross-verifying data obtained from various sources (source triangulation), such as members of the Regional People's Representative Council (DPRD), the executive branch, and civil society. Method triangulation was also employed by comparing data from interviews, observations, and documentation studies. This technique aims to reduce researcher bias and increase the validity of interpretations. Furthermore, a member checking process was conducted, in which some initial findings were reconfirmed with key informants to ensure the accuracy and appropriateness of the interpretations to their actual experiences.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

1. Analysis of the Implementation of the Supervisory Function of the Musi Banyu Asin Regency DPRD

Based on the research results, the Musi Banyu Asin Regency DPRD's oversight function has been procedurally implemented through formal instruments such as discussions of the Regent's Accountability Report (LKPJ), hearings (RDP) with Regional Work Units (SKPD), and field visits. However, findings in the field indicate that the implementation of this function tends to be ceremonial and not yet fully substantive. The oversight process often stops at the level of submitting recommendations without a strong and binding follow-up monitoring mechanism for the executive branch. From an accountability perspective, analysis of meeting minutes and interviews with Budget Agency members indicates that oversight of regional budget management remains limited. Although the Regional People's Representative Council (DPRD) provides strategic notes and recommendations on the LKPJ, findings confirm that many of these recommendations are not significantly followed up by regional

governments in subsequent budget cycles. This reflects the weak coercive power of legislative oversight instruments in holding executives accountable, thus preventing the principle of accountability within the framework of good governance from being optimally realized. The principle of transparency is a major obstacle to effective oversight. In-depth interviews with several commission leaders revealed difficulties in accessing detailed and timely budget realization data and program implementation reports from regional government agencies (SKPD). This limited access to information hinders the Regional People's Representative Council (DPRD)'s ability to accurately verify and evaluate executive performance. Consequently, oversight is less rigorous and tends to be based on aggregate data presented by local governments, with little room for in-depth critical analysis.

Public involvement in the oversight process, a crucial pillar of good governance, remains very limited. Although mechanisms such as public hearings have been established, observations indicate that these forums serve more as policy dissemination than as a means of gathering critical input. Voices from non-governmental organizations and citizen groups are often heard but rarely integrated into official recommendations from the Regional People's Representative Council (DPRD). This situation leads to an elitist oversight function that underrepresents the real problems faced by grassroots communities. In addition to external factors, research findings also identified internal challenges within the Regional People's Representative Council (DPRD). Limited human resource capacity, particularly in expert support for commissions, is one factor that weakens policy and budget analysis. Furthermore, party political dynamics often outweigh objective oversight. This is evident in the tendency for political compromise to compromise the council's critical stance on several strategic issues, thereby reducing the overall effectiveness of the oversight function in Musi Banyuasin Regency.

2. Inhibiting and Supporting Factors for Optimizing the Supervisory Function Based on the Principles of Good Governance

The main inhibiting factor identified in optimizing the oversight function is the low level of transparency from the executive branch. Interviews with informants from several commissions confirmed bureaucratic resistance to providing detailed and timely data on budget realization and program progress. Limited access to this crucial information directly hampers the Regional People's Representative Council's (DPRD) ability to conduct critical analysis and in-depth verification. Consequently, oversight becomes reactive and unable to objectively measure policy effectiveness, thus weakening the enforcement of accountability principles in regional governance. Internally, limited human resource capacity within the Regional People's Representative Council (DPRD) poses a significant obstacle. Findings indicate a limited number and competence of expert staff supporting commissions capable of conducting comprehensive policy and budget analysis. This lack of technical understanding often makes it difficult for council members to identify potential inefficiencies or irregularities in documents submitted by the executive branch. This situation creates a heavy reliance on processed data from local governments, thereby reducing the critical thinking and independence of the legislative oversight function.

Political intervention and strong party pragmatism are inhibiting factors that erode the substance of oversight. Meeting observations and in-depth interviews indicate that coalition interests between factions in the Regional People's Representative Council (DPRD) and the executive branch often temper the council's critical stance. Recommendations that could potentially cause political friction tend to be avoided or formulated normatively. This type of political compromise compromises the objectivity and decisiveness of the oversight function, resulting in many strategic issues related to local government performance never being seriously and thoroughly addressed. On the other hand, there are supporting factors that have the potential to strengthen the oversight function, namely increasing public pressure driven by non-governmental organizations and the mass media. The presence of civil society groups actively monitoring policies and budget utilization is a crucial catalyst. Media coverage of strategic issues forces the Regional People's Representative Council (DPRD) to be more responsive and take a clear stance. This external pressure can provide social capital for the DPRD to demand greater transparency and accountability from the executive branch.

A regulatory framework that grants strong oversight authority to the Regional People's Representative Council (DPRD) is a fundamental supporting factor. Furthermore, the development of electronic-based governance systems (SPBE)[1] such as e-budgeting and e-planning within local governments presents a strategic opportunity. These digital platforms, if optimized, can provide council members with more transparent and real-time data access. The use of information technology has the potential to shift oversight patterns from conventional to more accurate and effective evidence-based supervision.

3. The Role of Accountability and Transparency in the Effectiveness of DPRD Oversight

The research confirms that local government accountability is a fundamental objective of the Regional People's Representative Council's (DPRD) oversight function. Findings from the analysis of the Accountability Statement Report (LKPJ) and interviews indicate that when DPRD recommendations are not acted upon, the accountability cycle is broken. This renders oversight merely a procedural formality, rather than an effective instrument for ensuring executive performance aligns with the public interest. The weakness of sanctions or incentives for following up on recommendations is the root of the problem, delegitimizing the DPRD's oversight role in upholding the principles of good governance. Transparency has been identified as an absolute prerequisite for achieving accountability. Field data reveals that the difficulty of accessing detailed information on budget realization and project progress is a major obstacle. This limitation creates significant information asymmetry, with the executive controlling the performance narrative. This directly hampers the Regional People's Representative Council's (DPRD) ability to conduct independent verification and evidence-based evaluation. Without adequate data transparency, the oversight function loses its sharpness and is unable to demand substantive accountability from local governments.

The impact of low transparency is clearly visible on the quality of oversight. Observations during public hearings revealed discussions that tended to be normative and lacked depth because council members were not provided with comprehensive data. Reliance on aggregate reports presented by executives made critical analysis difficult. As a result, potential inefficiencies, program delays, or even budget irregularities went undetected early. This shallow quality of oversight ultimately undermined public trust in the Regional People's Representative Council (DPRD) as their representative. This research identifies the potential of electronic government systems (SPBE) as a strategic instrument for increasing transparency. Optimizing platforms such as e-budgeting and e-planning that are integrated and accessible in real time by the Regional People's Representative Council (DPRD) could be a solution. Utilizing this technology will shift the oversight paradigm from a post-audit approach to continuous monitoring. This will enable the DPRD to identify problems early and demand accountability proactively, rather than reactively after a program is completed. Ultimately, the effectiveness of accountability and transparency depends heavily on the political will of both parties. In-depth interview findings indicate that bureaucratic resistance to openness is often rooted in political interests designed to avoid critical scrutiny. Furthermore, the weak push by the Regional People's Representative Council (DPRD) for transparency is also influenced by coalition dynamics and political compromise. Therefore, strengthening the oversight function requires not only technical improvements but also a strong institutional commitment to making accountability a top priority.

4. Dynamics of Public Participation in Supporting the DPRD's Oversight Function

The research findings indicate that public participation in supporting the oversight function of the Musi Banyu Asin Regency Regional People's Representative Council (DPRD) remains largely ceremonial and has not been effectively institutionalized. Formal mechanisms such as Public Hearings (RDPU) have been held, but field observations confirm that these forums function primarily as a platform for top-down policy dissemination. Critical voices from the public and civil society groups are rarely incorporated into the council's official recommendations, resulting in oversight that tends to be elitist and disconnected from the real issues facing constituents. Low public participation is caused by a combination of public apathy and a lack of responsive channels. Interviews with community leaders revealed a distrust of the political process, where public input is perceived as unlikely to change decisions. Furthermore, the lack of a clear follow-up mechanism for citizen complaints makes participation futile. This creates a vicious cycle: the public is reluctant to participate because they feel unheard, and the Regional People's Representative Council (DPRD) loses crucial input to sharpen its oversight function over the executive's performance.

Amid low public participation, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and local media play a vital role as catalysts. Findings show that issues raised by NGOs often compel the Regional People's Representative Council (DPRD) to take a stand and conduct more in-depth oversight. NGOs act as aggregators of public interest and providers of alternative data, assisting council members in their analysis. However, their influence remains limited and often encounters political resistance, as their critical input is not always integrated into the institution's formal decisions. From an internal perspective, the Regional People's Representative Council (DPRD) has revealed ambivalence in its view of public participation. Some council members view public involvement as a crucial element of legitimacy, while others view it as a potential disruption to political stability and the compromises established with the executive branch. The DPRD's lack of proactive initiatives to systematically solicit public input indicates that public participation has not been a priority. This hinders the realization of collaborative oversight based on the

real needs of the community in Musi Banyuasin Regency. The use of digital technology presents an underutilized strategic opportunity to increase participation. Developing an online complaint platform or utilizing social media in a structured manner can bridge the gap between the public and the Regional People's Representative Council (DPRD). These digital channels allow for easier, faster, and more documented submission of concerns, thus serving as a database for the DPRD in carrying out its oversight function. Optimizing digital participation aligns with the principle of responsiveness in good governance, making oversight more relevant and accountable.

5. Strategy for Optimizing the Supervisory Function of the Musi Banyu Asin Regency DPRD Towards 2025

The first strategy that must be implemented is strengthening the internal institutional capacity of the Regional People's Representative Council (DPRD). This includes improving the technical competence of council members and support staff through regular training in policy analysis, budget oversight, and performance audits. Furthermore, recruitment of commission experts should be based on meritocracy and specific expertise, rather than political affiliation. Strengthening human resources is crucial for reducing information asymmetry with the executive branch, enabling the DPRD to conduct more incisive and evidence-based analysis. Next, optimizing the oversight function requires the systematic use of information technology. The Regional People's Representative Council (DPRD) needs to encourage the development of a digital oversight dashboard integrated with the local government's e-planning and e-budgeting systems. This platform should provide all council members with real-time data access on budget realization, project progress, and regional government unit (SKPD) performance achievements. This will shift the oversight model from a reactive and post-audit approach to a more proactive and preventative approach to continuous monitoring. The third strategy is to institutionalize more substantive and structured public participation. The Regional People's Representative Council (DPRD) must develop a responsive online complaint channel with clear follow-up mechanisms. Forums such as Public Hearings (RDPU) need to be reformed so that they are not merely ceremonial but rather become dialogical forums where input from civil society and academics is formally integrated into the council's recommendations. Meaningful public engagement will enhance the legitimacy and relevance of the oversight function.

To ensure effectiveness, the Regional People's Representative Council (DPRD) must establish a binding mechanism for monitoring the follow-up of recommendations. A dedicated working group or internal reporting system should be established to verify the implementation of each recommendation resulting from the LKPJ (Regional Budget Report) and public hearings. The results of this monitoring must be regularly published to the public to create political and social pressure on the executive branch. Without oversight of the results, this legislative function will remain weak and procedural. Finally, strengthening political commitment and synergy between supervisory institutions is necessary. The Regional People's Representative Council (DPRD) leadership needs to initiate an integrity pact between factions to prioritize objective oversight over pragmatic political interests. Furthermore, collaboration with external audit institutions such as the Supreme Audit Agency (BPK) and the government's internal oversight apparatus (APIP) must be strengthened. This synergy can take the form of exchanging audit data and implementing joint oversight on strategic issues, thereby creating a more comprehensive and effective oversight ecosystem.

CONCLUSION

Based on in-depth analysis, this study concludes that the Musi Banyu Asin Regency DPRD's oversight function has not been optimal and tends to be ceremonial rather than substantive. This failure stems from a combination of interrelated external and internal factors. Low transparency from the executive branch in providing data is a major obstacle, hampering the council's critical analysis. Internally, limited supporting human resource capacity and the dominance of party political compromises have eroded the objectivity of oversight. Consequently, existing oversight instruments fail to effectively uphold the principle of accountability within the framework of good governance. The primary implication of a weak oversight function is a broken cycle of local government accountability. Findings indicate that the Regional People's Representative Council's (DPRD) strategic recommendations are often not significantly followed up, rendering oversight merely a procedural formality lacking coercive power. This failure to enforce accountability is rooted in the unfulfilled two other pillars of good governance: transparency and participation. Information asymmetry resulting from the secrecy of executive data and the lack of institutionalized public involvement leads to oversight being elitist, superficial, and disconnected from the realities of community needs, thereby delegitimizing the representative role of the legislative body. Optimizing the DPRD's oversight function by 2025 requires a comprehensive strategic approach. This effort must begin with strengthening internal capacity by enhancing the competence of human resources and independent experts.

Furthermore, utilizing information technology through a digital oversight system integrated with executive e-budgeting is crucial to ensuring real-time data transparency. Externally, the DPRD must proactively institutionalize substantive public participation. Ultimately, all these technical improvements will only be effective if they are underpinned by a strong political commitment to prioritize objective oversight over pragmatic interests.

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