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IMPLEMENTATION OF THE POLICY FOR FULFILLING BASIC SERVICES FOR FLOOD DISASTER VICTIMS THROUGH MINIMUM SERVICE STANDARDS IN THE SOCIAL SECTOR

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Abstract

Disasters are inseparable from human life. Jakarta, as one of the major cities in Indonesia, is similarly inseparable from disasters, one of which is flooding. The government, as the policy-maker, must ensure that flood victims receive the basic services mandated under the Minimum Service Standards for the Social Sector. One area in Jakarta with the highest incidence of flooding is East Jakarta. This study aims to describe the implementation of the Minimum Service Standards in the Social Sector, particularly concerning flood disasters for flood victims in the Administrative City of East Jakarta. This study employs a qualitative research method using the policy implementation theoretical framework of Edwards (1980), which comprises four elements: communication, resources, disposition, and bureaucratic structure. The findings indicate that these four elements remain relatively sound in their implementation).

Keywords: Disaster, Flood, Minimum Service Standard, Policy Implementation

INTRODUCTION

Disasters refer to events or a series of events that potentially threaten and disrupt the survival and livelihoods of communities. These events may be triggered by natural, non-natural, or human-induced factors, subsequently resulting in loss of life, environmental degradation, loss of property, and psychological distress (Sinambela et al., 2021). Pursuant to Law Number 24 of 2007 concerning Disaster Management (2007), disasters are classified into three categories: natural disasters, non-natural disasters, and social disasters. Natural disasters are those arising from natural occurrences, such as earthquakes, tsunamis, volcanic eruptions, floods, droughts, typhoons, and landslides. Non-natural disasters are disasters originating from non-natural occurrences, for instance, technological failures, failures of modernization, epidemics, and disease outbreaks. Meanwhile, social disasters are disasters caused by human-induced events, such as social conflicts between groups or community clusters, as well as acts of terrorism.

One of the major cities in Indonesia is the Special Capital Region (Daerah Khusus Ibukota, DKI) Jakarta. DKI Jakarta is a major city that serves as the economic center of Indonesia, rendering it highly attractive to people from various regions who migrate to the city in pursuit of urbanization. Data from the Population and Civil Registration Agency (Dinas Dukcapil) of the Special Capital Region of Jakarta indicate that the number of newcomers ranges from 10,000 to 15,000 individuals annually, as reported by Tempo (2024). Moreover, according to the most recent data in 2024, Jakarta received 16,207 newcomers. According to CNBC (2024), Jakarta ranked sixth among provinces in Indonesia in terms of population size in 2024, with a total of 10.68 million inhabitants

In 2025, Jakarta is once again projected to experience population growth. According to data from the 2020 Population Census of the Central Bureau of Statistics (Badan Pusat Statistik, BPS), Jakarta's population in 2024 was recorded at 10,677,975 inhabitants (BPS, 2025). Meanwhile, the population growth rate in 2025, when measured against the 2020 baseline, stands at 0.23 percent. Population growth is intrinsically linked to disasters, particularly flooding. Research conducted by Katherina demonstrates that rapid population growth within limited urban areas compels communities to settle in disaster-prone zones and triggers land-use conversion that deviates from designated spatial allocations. The reduction of water infiltration areas consequently influences the magnitude

of runoff and water discharge entering the city, especially during the rainy season. With such compounded problems, this inevitably results in casualties from flood disasters in Jakarta. In early 2026, specifically in January, 45 neighborhood units (RT) and 22 road segments in Jakarta were inundated.

The regional government has also given attention to the relocation of disaster victims to evacuation sites. Abdul Muhari, representing the National Disaster Management Agency (Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Bencana, BNPB), added that the fulfillment of basic necessities for displaced persons during their stay at evacuation sites must be guaranteed, including ready-to-eat food, clean water, clothing, sanitation facilities, and various other necessities. Regarding disaster management itself, a specific standard governing it is in fact already available. This standard is stipulated in the Minimum Service Standards (Standar Pelayanan Minimal, SPM), which constitute a shared affair among the central government, provincial governments, and district/municipal governments. Based on Government Regulation Number 2 of 2018, mandatory governmental affairs relating to basic services encompass the sectors of Education, Health, public works and spatial planning, public housing and settlement areas, public order and security as well as community protection, and the Social sector.

The characteristics of Jakarta, which exhibits high water flow rates and extreme rainfall annually, further compound the complexity of flood management. The East Jakarta region frequently emerges as the most severely affected area, owing, among other factors, to the diminished water infiltration capacity resulting from increased development, a drainage system that remains insufficiently adequate, and waste management issues that exacerbate the blockage of water channels. These various obstacles have prevented the implementation of SPM in flood management from operating optimally, with the consequence that communities continue to face difficulties in accessing basic services when disasters occur.

Consequently, this background of the problem demonstrates the urgency of evaluating and strengthening the implementation of Minimum Service Standards in flood management in Jakarta, particularly in vulnerable areas such as East Jakarta. The strengthening of SPM must be supported by infrastructure improvement, heightened public awareness, and inter-agency collaboration in order to minimize disaster risk and impact in a sustainable manner. Understanding and addressing this issue constitutes a crucial element in shaping Jakarta into a more resilient city prepared to confront future flood threats.

Based on the foregoing elaboration, the formulation of the problem serving as the research question in this study is: "How is the implementation of the Minimum Service Standards in the Social Sector, particularly concerning Flood Disasters for Flood Victims in the Administrative City of East Jakarta?" Consequently, this study ultimately aims to describe the implementation of the Minimum Service Standards in the Social Sector, particularly concerning Flood Disasters for Flood Victims in the Administrative City of East Jakarta. The researcher will employ the theory of Edwards III (1980) concerning policy implementation in this study.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Various previous studies have addressed flooding. The following is a summary:

Research focus	Discussion	Researcher
Analysis of Flood Causes in Jakarta	Flooding in DKI Jakarta is caused by urban development encompassing demographic aspects, namely rapid population growth in urban areas; land-use aspects, namely the increasing demand for land for settlements in urban areas; and land-use conversion, namely the transformation of non-built-up areas into built-up areas associated with the physical expansion of the city as an impact of urbanization.	Eldi, (2021)
Evaluation of Government Policy and Sustainable Solutions	An ecosystem-based approach, improvement of green infrastructure, and the integration of technology into early warning systems are required to enhance the city's resilience to flooding..	Jelibseda et al., (2025)

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High Flood Disaster Risk Level in Jakarta	The level of preparedness can be measured by five indicators, namely knowledge and attitudes toward disaster risk, emergency plans, preparedness policies and guidelines, disaster alarm systems, and the capacity to mobilize resources.	Taryana et al., (2022)
Policy Implementation in Flood Disaster Mitigation	Flood Disaster Prevention, Flood Disaster Emergency Response, Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of flood disasters still encounter numerous problems	Muhammad & Aziz, (2020)
Inter-coalition conflict in the flood management policy network	Conflict between coalitions within a vertical policy network triggers goal refraction, resulting in the flood and tidal flood management policy goals of Semarang City being divided into three categories of refraction, namely areas of narrowing, areas of broadening, and areas of detachment.	Suwitri, (2008)
Policy Directions for Flash Flood Disaster Mitigation in River Basin Areas	Alternative policies for flash flood disaster mitigation are examined based on three aspects, namely land characteristics, flash flood hazard level, and social vulnerability	Putri, (2018)
Policy Directions for Mitigation in Flood-Prone Zones	In the context of mitigation efforts to reduce flood risk, three policy directions are formulated, namely disaster education, strengthening socialization in flood-prone zones, and disaster-based spatial planning.	I. Umar & Dewata, (2018)
Flood Disaster Mitigation from a Public Policy Perspective	The policy of enhancing regional government capacity in facing flood disasters is realized through prevention and preparedness efforts. This policy is manifested in the form of regional development in disaster-prone areas directed toward the integration of mitigation measures, both structural (physical) mitigation and non-structural mitigation (in the form of regulations and policies)	Zulaeha et al., (2022)
Tidal Flood Disaster Mitigation in North Jakarta	The phenomenon of tidal flooding and the negative impacts it has generated in North Jakarta indicate a lack of vigilance and preparedness in facing the threat of flooding	Karana & Suprihardjo,(2013)
Community Understanding of Flooding	Understanding of flooding—encompassing causes, impacts, and the desire to relocate—is associated with education level, income, distance of the house from the river, number of floors of the house, and home ownership status.	Ayuningtyas & Rahayu, (2014)

However, none of the aforementioned studies discuss the policy stakeholders involved in resolving flood disasters. Therefore, this study focuses on that particular aspect. The theory employed in this study is the policy implementation theory of Edwards III (1980). Edwards (1980) is one of the scholars who formulated an analytical framework frequently used to explain why a public policy may succeed or, conversely, fail in its implementation. In his work entitled "Implementing Public Policy," he asserts that policy implementation concerns not merely the process of policy formulation, but also how such policy can be executed effectively at the field level (Edwards III, 1980).

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George C. Edwards III is one of the scholars who formulated an analytical framework frequently employed to explain why a public policy may succeed or, conversely, fail in its implementation. In his work entitled "Implementing Public Policy," he asserts that policy implementation concerns not merely the process of policy formulation, but also how such policy can be executed effectively at the field level (Edwards III, 1980). According to Edwards III (1980), there are four principal aspects influencing the success of implementation, namely communication, resources, disposition (implementers' attitude), and bureaucratic structure. These four aspects serve as benchmarks for assessing the extent to which a policy is effective in its practical application. The following are the four policy variables: communication, resources, disposition,

METHOD

The role of the researcher in this study is that of the key instrument (Creswell, 2007). This is because, in qualitative research, the researcher personally collects data by conducting interviews, observing behavior, and employing other data collection methods. This study employs a descriptive approach. In general, descriptive research is a method that aims to describe phenomena that occur, whether in the present or in the past. According to Furchan (2004), descriptive research possesses two principal characteristics, namely describing a phenomenon as it is through systematic, rigorous, objective, and meticulous examination, and neither administering any particular treatment or control nor conducting hypothesis testing on the problem under investigation.


The data collection technique used in this study is interviews as the primary technique. In addition, the researcher also employs field observation to strengthen the data. The research location, as stated in the introduction, is in East Jakarta, more specifically in Kampung Melayu Village, Jatinegara District, East Jakarta.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

1. RESULTS

1.1. *General Overview of East Jakarta*

East Jakarta is one of the administrative areas at the city/regency level in the Special Capital Region of Jakarta Province, located in the eastern part of the capital's mainland. In 2021, the population of this area reached 3,037,139 inhabitants, with a density level of 16,152 inhabitants per square kilometer. East Jakarta is a flood-prone area, and its incidence rate is relatively high compared to other administrative cities in the Special Capital Region of Jakarta Province, with a fluctuating number of flood events. The following is a graph of flood disaster events in East Jakarta from 2019 to 2024.



1.2. Policy Implementation

1.2.1. *Communication*

*B*ased on information from the Ministry of Home Affairs informant, socialization regarding the Minimum Service Standards has been carried out massively to the regions. According to the Ministry of Social Affairs informant, Minister of Social Affairs Regulation Number 9 of 2018 was directly socialized from the outset of its formation. Socialization of regulations concerning the minimum service standards in the social sector was carried out in collaboration among relevant institutions, namely the Ministry of Home Affairs as the primary ministry responsible for the Minimum Service Standards, the Ministry of Social Affairs as the primary ministry responsible for the Minimum Service Standards in the Social Sector, and

regional governments. Furthermore, the informant from the Ministry of Social Affairs revealed that a communication forum in the form of a WhatsApp group has been established. Thus, socialization is not merely occasional, held only once or twice, but is conducted gradually whenever there are policy updates from the central government. The socialization most frequently conducted regarding the Minimum Service Standards is by the Ministry of Home Affairs. The Ministry of Social Affairs only occasionally conducts socialization and technical assistance and instead optimizes the communication forum in the WhatsApp group. The Ministry of Social Affairs explained that in the near future there will be changes to the technical standards of the Minimum Service Standards in the Social Sector as stipulated in Minister of Social Affairs Regulation Number 9 of 2018.

According to the informant from the DKI Jakarta Social Services Office, the SPM policy in the Social Sector has been understood by the regional government as the implementer. The DKI Jakarta Social Services Office has been aware of the discourse concerning changes to said policy. In line with the DKI Jakarta Social Services Office, the East Jakarta Social Sub-Department acknowledged that it has become accustomed to the Minimum Service Standards in the Social Sector policy, which has been in effect since 2018. According to the Tagana informant, the informant acknowledged having received socialization regarding the SPM in the Social Sector, particularly concerning disasters, although such socialization was conducted a long time ago.

1.2.2. Resources

The role of leadership in the implementation of disaster policy in the regions is led by the National Disaster Management Agency/Regional Disaster Management Agency. Although there are special cases such as the major flood in Sumatra that claimed victims across provinces, the President appointed the Ministry of Home Affairs as the leader for the handling of the major flood disaster in Sumatra. There is a systematic flow for safeguarding Planning, Budgeting, and Monitoring and evaluation conducted by the Ministry of Home Affairs toward Regional Governments. In terms of budget, according to information from the Ministry of Home Affairs informant, the problem frequently experienced by regions in implementing policies is the limitation of their fiscal capacity.

At the Ministry of Social Affairs, there is already a special work unit within the Ministry of Social Affairs that focuses on disaster management policy. With the existence of a special work unit at the Ministry of Social Affairs focusing on disaster management policy, this automatically results in the availability of a budget at the Ministry of Social Affairs for disasters, although there is no specific budget for flood disasters. The facilities, infrastructure, and technology possessed by the Ministry of Social Affairs are already adequate for flood disaster management. Regarding access to data, according to the Ministry of Social Affairs informant, this is important to carry out during disasters, particularly for policy implementers such as Tagana.

The informant from the DKI Jakarta Social Services Office explained that within their organizational structure there is also a work unit that accommodates the operation of disaster management policy. The Social Services Office certainly also allocates a budget for the disaster budget line each year. Regarding the facilities, infrastructure, and technology possessed by the DKI Jakarta Social Services Office during disasters, the informant from the DKI Jakarta Social Services Office acknowledged that these are already quite good and complete. As for access to data, this is certainly also a focus for the DKI Jakarta Provincial Social Services Office in terms of flood disaster management.

From the East Jakarta Social Sub-Department, there are human resources responsible for flood disaster management in the East Jakarta area, both ASN (State Civil Apparatus) and Non-ASN. The budget they possess is not specific to flood disasters; there is only a general disaster budget. Furthermore, the mechanism for data undertaken by the East Jakarta Social Sub-Department is to coordinate with the village office regarding activities that have been carried out.

As for Tagana, in addition to having a considerable number of human resources, they also possess high initiative when disasters occur. The Tagana informant explained that the budget

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aspect mechanism is inseparable from and facilitated by the Directorate of Social Protection for Disaster Victims of the Ministry of Social Affairs. The Disaster Preparedness Cadets explained that they still use old facilities and infrastructure; nevertheless, these remain functional.

1.2.3. *Disposition*

The informant from the Ministry of Home Affairs revealed that the policy for fulfilling mandatory affairs, in this case the minimum service standards, is safeguarded up to the strategic policy at the national level. Furthermore, there is routine assessment from the central government regarding the commitment of regional governments in terms of implementing the SPM policy. At the Ministry of Social Affairs, the ministry's strategic plan encompasses disasters, although it does not specifically list flood disasters since the strategic plan is more global in nature. Both the leadership and policy implementers are highly committed in terms of disaster management.

At the DKI Jakarta Social Services Office, the informant revealed that the disaster aspect has been incorporated into the strategic plan of the DKI Jakarta Social Services Office, particularly flood disasters. The leadership and policy implementers within the DKI Jakarta Social Services Office have demonstrated commitment. The commitment of implementers is directly related to the reward and punishment mechanism within the scope of the DKI Jakarta Social Services Office, namely that it can influence the reduction of income, which is likewise applied at the East Jakarta Social Sub-Department. The East Jakarta Social Sub-Department also added that rewards are directed not only to ASN within the East Jakarta Social Sub-Department, but also to Non-ASN employees

1.2.4. Bureaucratic Structure

The Ministry of Home Affairs ensures that there is already a formation of persons responsible for the fields undertaken by the Ministry of Home Affairs. Furthermore, the Ministry of Home Affairs also explained that there is already a delegation of activities for SPM implementation to Regional Governments. In disaster management, there is already an Organizational Structure and Work Procedure governing the division of tasks in terms of flood disaster management in the regions. The Ministry of Home Affairs has a role in encouraging Regional Governments to conduct annual planning related to disaster issues, particularly the SPM.

At the Ministry of Social Affairs, the line of coordination in disaster management has been stipulated in an SOP (Standard Operating Procedure) initiated by the Directorate of Social Protection for Disaster Victims. There is already a clear division of tasks among actors implementing disaster policy. The informant from the Ministry of Social Affairs explained that there is already a clear division of tasks between BNPB/BPBD and the Ministry of Social Affairs in terms of flood disaster management in the field. Furthermore, the Ministry of Social Affairs also stated that there is a discourse within the Ministry of Social Affairs to become involved in pre-disaster matters.

The DKI Jakarta Social Services Office also possesses an SOP in terms of disaster management. The informant added that within the scope of the DKI Jakarta Provincial Government there is also a clear division of tasks among OPD (Regional Apparatus Organizations) when a disaster event occurs, particularly a flood disaster. When a flood disaster occurs in Jakarta, the holder of the command for disaster management in the field, as explained by the informant from the DKI Jakarta Social Services Office, is the village head (lurah).

As for the Disaster Preparedness Cadets, as one of the front-line actors in disaster management, they explained that they already possess an SOP in disaster management. Furthermore, the division of tasks between Tagana and other actors in terms of disaster management, particularly flood disasters, is already clear.

1.2.5. Field Observation

In collecting data, the researcher did not merely collect data from interviews with policy stakeholders; the researcher also conducted field activities by carrying out field observations in areas frequently affected by flooding in East Jakarta, namely on Jalan Kebon Pala 1, Kampung

Melayu, Jatinegara. There, the researcher also conducted interviews with two individuals, namely the local neighborhood unit (RT) head and a local resident.

Based on the interview with informant S, the RT head, he explained that the area has been a regular flood location since he was born there. As RT head, he explained that when the flood status has reached Alert 1 (Siaga 1), residents are asked to evacuate. The evacuation locations are usually SD 01 Kampung Melayu and the Kampung Melayu Village Office. For flood disaster management command, the RT-RW is usually the command holder because they are closest to the residents. Information such as flood status and when to evacuate is usually distributed in the WhatsApp group among residents. At the evacuation site, the primary assistance distributed is usually food. In addition, there is also assistance for vulnerable groups such as infants (medicine, diapers, etc.) and also necessities for the elderly. The logistics warehouse for emergency needs during disasters, according to informant S, is located at the Kampung Melayu Village Office.

In the interview with informant W, a local resident, he similarly explained that the area has been a regular flood location since he was born there in 1975. According to him, flooding on Jalan Kebon Pala 1 occurs routinely every year due to the overflow of the Ciliwung River. When flooding occurs, he usually remains in his house, which is designed somewhat higher to anticipate surges in water discharge. If the flood becomes sufficiently severe, only then does he decide to evacuate to the elementary school or the Kampung Melayu Village Office. Evacuation appeals from the village office are usually conveyed through the mosque. At the evacuation site, he usually receives food and basic necessities. The condition of the food served, according to informant W, is already good. In addition to food, there are also health services and psychosocial support services provided at the evacuation site. However, he sometimes finds it difficult at the disaster location because the road leading to his house is very narrow, making evacuation equipment such as rubber boats difficult to reach his house. Therefore, he sometimes chooses to remain at home while waiting for assistance such as basic necessities or food and clothing from residents located at higher ground (not affected by flooding.



2. Discussion

As the researcher has written in the data findings chapter, in the analysis of the Implementation of Basic Service Provision for Flood Disaster Victims through Minimum Service Standards in the Social Sector in the Administrative City of East Jakarta, the researcher will dissect the data findings obtained from various informants using the policy implementation concept of Edwards III (1980), which the researcher will divide in this data analysis sub-chapter into 4 sub-chapters: communication, resources, disposition, and bureaucratic structure

2.1. Communication

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The Minimum Service Standards policy is regulated in Government Regulation (PP) Number 2 of 2018 concerning Minimum Service Standards. In order to achieve communication that can be conveyed clearly as expressed by Edwards III (1980), the Ministry of Home Affairs stated in the interview session that socialization regarding the Minimum Service Standards has been carried out massively to the regions.

The responsibility of policy holders regarding the Minimum Service Standards does not belong solely to the Ministry of Home Affairs. The Minimum Service Standards, which in the context of this research writing is the Minimum Service Standards in the Social Sector, is translated more technically into Minister of Social Affairs Regulation Number 9 of 2018 concerning Technical Standards for Basic Services in the Minimum Service Standards (SPM) in the Social Sector in provincial and district/municipal regions. The responsibility for said policy lies with the Ministry of Social Affairs. In order for the policy to be understood clearly by regional governments, it is the responsibility of the Ministry of Social Affairs to socialize said policy to the regions. This is acknowledged by the Ministry of Social Affairs informant, who stated that Minister of Social Affairs Regulation Number 9 of 2018 was directly socialized from the outset of its formation. Socialization is also conducted collaboratively, meaning that socialization of regulations concerning the minimum service standards in the social sector is carried out in collaboration among relevant institutions, namely the Ministry of Home Affairs as the primary ministry responsible for the Minimum Service Standards, the Ministry of Social Affairs as the primary ministry responsible for the Minimum Service Standards in the Social Sector, and regional governments.

The Ministry of Social Affairs explained that a communication forum in the form of a WhatsApp group has been established. Thus, socialization is not merely occasional, held only once or twice, but is conducted gradually whenever there are policy updates from the central government. This is certainly to ensure that the policy is conveyed clearly and consistently as articulated by (Edwards III, 1980).

To ascertain whether the policy concerning the implementation of SPM in the Social Sector has been well understood, particularly by the regional government as the policy implementer, the researcher interviewed the DKI Jakarta Social Services Office. The Social Services Office, as the policy implementer, explained that the SPM policy in the Social Sector has been understood by the regional government as the implementer. Furthermore, the DKI Jakarta Social Services Office has been aware of the discourse concerning changes to Minister of Social Affairs Regulation Number 9 of 2018 regarding Technical Standards for Basic Services in the Minimum Service Standards (SPM) in the Social Sector in provincial and district/municipal regions.

In addition to the DKI Jakarta Social Services Office, the researcher also interviewed the East Jakarta Social Sub-Department, which is also an actor implementing the SPM policy in the Social Sector. The East Jakarta Social Sub-Department acknowledged that it has become accustomed to the Minimum Service Standards in the Social Sector policy, which has been in effect since 2018. Furthermore, the informant also added that there are no policies perceived as changing or confusing. This confirms the thinking of Edwards III (1980) regarding good policy communication.

The disaster policy implementers in the field, namely the Disaster Preparedness Cadets (Tagana), also stated in their statements when the researcher interviewed them that Tagana acknowledged having received socialization regarding the SPM in the Social Sector, particularly concerning disasters, although such socialization was conducted a long time ago. Furthermore, there is no confusion on the part of Tagana in understanding the SPM policy in the Social Sector

2.2. Resources

The Disaster Management Policy, as explained by the Ministry of Home Affairs informant, involves many parties in terms of Human Resources. The role of leadership in the implementation of disaster policy, such as flood disasters in the regions, is led by the National Disaster Management Agency/Regional Disaster Management Agency. Although there are special cases such as the major flood in Sumatra that claimed victims across provinces, the President appointed the Ministry of Home Affairs as the leader for the handling of the major flood disaster in Sumatra. Although special, this is perceived as confusing because it appears to negate the role of BNPB as the responsible party for the disaster cluster and instead chooses the Ministry of Home Affairs as the leader/person responsible for handling the major flood disaster in Sumatra.

Furthermore, the Ministry of Home Affairs has a role in controlling the implementation of policies undertaken by regional governments. There is a systematic flow for safeguarding Planning, Budgeting, and Monitoring and evaluation conducted by the Ministry of Home Affairs toward Regional

Governments. If linked to the concept of Policy Resources from Edwards III (1980), the Ministry of Home Affairs has a role as the leading sector to ensure the capacity of regional governments in implementing policies undertaken by regional governments.

Policy implementation in regional governments has its own responsibilities and dynamics. One of these is the budget. Edwards III (1980) states that financial resources concern the availability of sufficient budget to support the implementation, monitoring, and management of programs. The problem occurring in Regional Governments in implementing policies is the limitation of their fiscal capacity. The Ministry of Home Affairs has made arrangements should such a situation occur.

At the Ministry of Social Affairs, as one of the implementers of disaster policy, there is already a special work unit at the Ministry of Social Affairs that focuses on disaster management policy, namely the Directorate of Social Protection for Disaster Victims. With the existence of a special work unit at the Ministry of Social Affairs focusing on disaster management policy, this automatically results in the availability of a budget at the Ministry of Social Affairs for disasters, although there is no specific budget for flood disasters. This is consistent with the thinking of Edwards III (1980), who argues that budgets serve to support the implementation, monitoring, and management of programs. Regarding facilities, infrastructure, and technology related to flood disasters, the informant from the Ministry of Social Affairs stated that the facilities, infrastructure, and technology possessed by the Ministry of Social Affairs are already adequate for flood disaster management. Another resource element, namely access to data, according to the Ministry of Social Affairs informant, is important to carry out during disasters, particularly for policy implementers such as Tagana.

One of the disaster policy implementers in the regions, namely the DKI Jakarta Social Services Office, explained in its interview that within their organizational structure there is also a work unit that accommodates the operation of disaster management policy. As Edwards III (1980) states that capable Human Resources can have an impact on the success of policy implementation, the DKI Jakarta Social Services Office has a strategy to realize this. In addition to ASN within the DKI Jakarta Provincial Social Services Office and also ASN distributed across the five social sub-departments of each administrative city in DKI Jakarta Province, there are also non-ASN elements that play a role in terms of flood disaster management in DKI Jakarta. In terms of budget, the DKI Jakarta Social Services Office certainly also allocates a budget for the disaster budget line each year, although the informant interviewed by the researcher did not know precisely the amount of the disaster budget each year. The supporting resource element considered important by Edwards III (1980) is facilities, infrastructure, and technology. Regarding the facilities, infrastructure, and technology possessed by the DKI Jakarta Social Services Office during disasters, the informant from the DKI Jakarta Social Services Office acknowledged that these are already quite good and complete. Another resource, namely access to data, was also explained by the informant to certainly be a focus for the DKI Jakarta Provincial Social Services Office in terms of flood disaster management.

Turning to the East Jakarta Social Sub-Department, there are human resources responsible for flood disaster management in the East Jakarta area. In order to optimize the human resources possessed, in addition to ASN, the East Jakarta Social Sub-Department also has contract employees, namely PSKB (Social Companions for Disaster Victims), so that policy implementers in the field can be more optimal. In terms of budget, there is no specific budget for flood disasters; rather, there is only a general disaster budget. As for the third resource, namely facilities, infrastructure, and technology, the informant from the East Jakarta Social Sub-Department explained that these are already adequate. The last resource, namely access to data, in disaster cases such as flooding, the East Jakarta Social Sub-Department coordinates with the village office. There are also social companions at the village office. The data they gather will be reported to the DKI Jakarta Social Services Office. Based on the information provided by the informant from the DKI Jakarta Social Sub-Department, as the policy implementer closest to the flood-affected areas, they have carried out good policy implementation in accordance with what was expressed by (Edwards III, 1980).

The front-line implementers in disaster management, particularly flood disasters, namely the Disaster Preparedness Cadets (Tagana), explained in the interview session that Tagana has been trained and they already possess the initiative to mobilize when disasters occur. In terms of budget, there is in fact confusion. The informant from Tagana explained that the budget aspect mechanism is inseparable from and facilitated by the Directorate of PSKB of the Ministry of Social Affairs. Yet the Social Services

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Office also acknowledges having Tagana in their working area. This certainly must become a concern for parties such as the Ministry of Social Affairs, the Social Services Office, and the social sub-departments of the relevant administrative cities regarding the "ownership status" of Tagana. In terms of the resource of facilities, infrastructure, and technology, the informant from the Disaster Preparedness Cadets explained that they still use old facilities and infrastructure; nevertheless, these remain functional. In the aspect of access to data, volunteer data is held by the Ministry of Social Affairs as the "parent" institution. If analyzed with the concept of Resources in policy implementation by Edwards III (1980), the policy has been well implemented by the Disaster Preparedness Cadets (Tagana)

2.3. ***Disposition***

Disposition refers to the attitudes, commitment, and willingness of policy implementers in carrying out their duties. Edwards III (1980) emphasizes that the success of policy implementation is largely determined by: (1) the extent to which the policy is accepted and receives support from leadership and implementers, and (2) the magnitude of the commitment of leadership and implementers to support and realize the objectives of said policy.

The first informant, from the Ministry of Home Affairs, explained that the policy for fulfilling mandatory affairs, in this case the minimum service standards, is safeguarded up to the strategic policy at the national level as stipulated in the National Medium-Term Development Plan (Rencana Pembangunan Jangka Menengah Nasional, RPJMN). As expressed by Edwards III (1980) regarding the magnitude of the commitment of leadership and implementers to support and realize policy objectives, it is evident that the Minimum Service Standards constitute a policy that is the primary focus of the central government. Furthermore, the informant from the Ministry of Home Affairs also added that there is routine assessment from the central government regarding the commitment of regional governments in terms of implementing the SPM policy. This serves to ensure whether leadership in regional governments maintains focus in safeguarding the implementation of the policy in the regions or areas they lead.

The Ministry of Social Affairs also explained that the ministry's strategic plan encompasses disasters, although it does not specifically list flood disasters since the strategic plan is more global in nature. Furthermore, the informant also explained that both the leadership and policy implementers are highly committed in terms of disaster management. As with the Ministry of Home Affairs, analysis using the concept of Disposition from Edwards III (1980) also indicates that the inclusion of disasters in the strategic plan of the Ministry of Social Affairs demonstrates the magnitude of the commitment of leadership and implementers to support and realize the objectives of said policy. In addition, within the Ministry of Social Affairs there exists a reward and punishment mechanism intended for policy implementers in the field, namely the Disaster Preparedness Cadets, in the form of tali asih (compassionate allowance).

At the regional level, namely the DKI Jakarta Social Services Office, the informant explained that the flood disaster aspect has been incorporated into the strategic plan of the DKI Jakarta Social Services Office for 2025–2029. The leadership and policy implementers at the DKI Jakarta Social Services Office also possess commitment in terms of implementing the policy in their region. The commitment of implementers is directly related to the reward and punishment mechanism within the scope of the DKI Jakarta Social Services Office, namely that it can influence the reduction of income. This is consistent with the thinking of Edwards III (1980) regarding the commitment of leadership and policy implementers, albeit employing an unconventional strategy, namely "testing" commitment through the mechanism of employee income.

In line with the strategy employed within the DKI Jakarta Social Services Office, at the level of the East Jakarta Social Sub-Department, an income-based strategy is also used so that leadership and policy implementers remain committed in terms of policy implementation within the East Jakarta Social Sub-Department. Furthermore, there is a different measure undertaken by the East Jakarta Social Sub-Department, namely that the reward mechanism is directed not only to ASN within the East Jakarta Social Sub-Department, but also to Non-ASN employees.

Among the flood disaster policy implementers in the field, namely the Disaster Preparedness Cadets, the informant from the Disaster Preparedness Cadets stated that they are highly committed in terms of disaster management, such as flood disasters or other disasters. This is because if they do not implement the policy in the field, as expressed by the informant from the Ministry of Social Affairs in the preceding paragraphs, their tali asih cannot be disbursed.

2.4. Bureaucratic Structure

A sound bureaucratic structure is an important factor in supporting policy implementation. Edwards III (1980) emphasizes that such a structure must be efficient, capable of coordinating activities across units, and possess minimal obstacles so that policy implementation can proceed smoothly and in a directed manner

The Ministry of Home Affairs ensures that there is already a formation of persons responsible for the fields undertaken by the Ministry of Home Affairs, namely the Directorate of Synchronization of Regional Government Affairs (SUPD) III, which handles Health, social, and Public Order, Security, and Community Protection matters. Housing and Settlement Areas as well as Public Works affairs are in Directorate SUPD II. Education is in SUPD IV. The Ministry of Home Affairs also explained that there is already a delegation of activities for SPM implementation to Regional Governments by appointing the Regional Secretary as its leader. Regarding disaster management, the Ministry of Home Affairs informant explained that there is already an Organizational Structure and Work Procedure governing the division of tasks in terms of flood disaster management in the regions. The Ministry of Home Affairs also has a role in encouraging Regional Governments to conduct annual planning related to disaster issues, particularly the Minimum Service Standards. If analyzed with the concept of Bureaucratic Structure from Edwards III (1980), the Ministry of Home Affairs has been capable of coordinating activities across units so that policy implementation can proceed well.

At the Ministry of Social Affairs, the line of coordination in disaster management has been stipulated in an SOP (Standard Operating Procedure) initiated by the Directorate of Social Protection for Disaster Victims. Furthermore, there is already a clear division of tasks among actors implementing disaster policy, where according to the disaster policy cluster officially regulated in the Decree of the Head of the National Disaster Management Agency (BNPB) Number 308 of 2024 concerning Disaster Management Clusters, the Ministry of Social Affairs is responsible for the Evacuation and Protection Cluster, which encompasses the provision of safe places, basic logistics for displaced persons, and public kitchens. If analyzed with the concept of bureaucratic structure from Edwards III (1980), the existence of said disaster management cluster has the function of coordinating activities across units so as to stimulate policy implementation to proceed smoothly and in a directed manner.

The DKI Jakarta Social Services Office, in implementing disaster policy, also possesses an SOP in terms of disaster management. SOP, according to Edwards III (1980), is an effort to produce clear and directed policies. Furthermore, the DKI Jakarta Social Services Office also has a clear division of tasks among OPD (Regional Apparatus Organizations) when a disaster event occurs, particularly a flood disaster. There is something unique based on the explanation from the DKI Jakarta Social Services Office informant, who explained that when a flood disaster occurs in Jakarta, the holder of the local command for disaster management in the field is the village head (lurah).

As policy implementers in the field, the Disaster Preparedness Cadets, as one of the front-line actors in disaster management, explained that they already possess an SOP in disaster management. Furthermore, the division of tasks between Tagana and other actors in terms of disaster management, particularly flood disasters, is already clear, with Tagana focusing on the evacuation and protection cluster. The informant from the Disaster Preparedness Cadets also explained the division of tasks of the Pusdalops (Operations Control Center) of Tagana and also the implementation of SPM in the field. The involvement of Tagana in the protection and evacuation cluster as well as the existence of an Operations Control Center of Tagana indicate that policy implementation can proceed smoothly and in a directed manner while they are on duty in the field.

2.5. Analysis of Field Observation

Based on field observation activities in areas frequently affected by flooding in East Jakarta, namely on Jalan Kebon Pala 1, Kampung Melayu, Jatinegara, the researcher obtained several matters that can be analyzed. The first is the Command in terms of flood disaster management in the field. The RT head informant explained that flood disaster management is usually commanded by the RT-RW because they are closest to the residents. This differs from the explanation of the DKI Jakarta Social Services Office informant, who explained that the local command in the field in terms of flood disasters is the village head (lurah). At the evacuation site, based on the evacuation and protection cluster, the Ministry of Social Affairs as the responsible party for said cluster is obligated to provide safe places, basic logistics for displaced persons, and public kitchens. This was confirmed by informant S, the local RT head, and informant W, a local resident. The evacuation locations perceived as safe are the Kampung Melayu Village Office and the

elementary school in Kampung Melayu. In addition to the provision of food and places for temporary survival, the evacuation site also provides health services and psychosocial support services (LDP). This is in accordance with the Technical Guidelines for Psychosocial Support Services for Disaster Victims regulated by the Ministry of Social Affairs. Furthermore, the Kampung Melayu Village Office, based on the explanation of the local RT head informant, was explained to have a disaster logistics storage warehouse already available at the village office. Assistance for disaster victims usually includes not only food but also special needs such as medicines, infant and elderly supplies. This is consistent with Article 15 of Minister of Social Affairs Regulation Number 9 of 2018.\

CONCLUSION

Based on the objective of this study, namely to describe the implementation of the Minimum Service Standards in the Social Sector, particularly concerning Flood Disasters for Flood Victims in the Administrative City of East Jakarta, using the policy implementation concept of Edwards III (1980) as an analytical tool against the various data findings obtained from the field, the researcher may conclude that policy implementation has proceeded well, although there remain several notes from the researcher.

From the communication aspect, the SPM Policy was initiated with the birth of PP Number 2 of 2018 concerning Minimum Service Standards, with the Ministry of Home Affairs as the party responsible for the operation of SPM across various sectors throughout Indonesia. Since regional governments are the ones implementing this policy in the field, socialization of said policy must certainly be carried out so that the policy can proceed in a straight line from upstream to downstream. In the SPM in the Social Sector, socialization is carried out by involving the Ministry of Home Affairs, the Ministry of Social Affairs, and the Government Bureau and relevant OPD (Regional Apparatus Organizations) in each region. The Ministry of Social Affairs, as the party responsible for the operation of SPM in the Social Sector in the regions, safeguards said policy, such as by conducting technical assistance and establishing a communication forum in a WhatsApp group. This has proven to be effective. This is evidenced by the absence of confusion, both for policy implementers at the regional level such as the Social Services Office and Social Sub-Departments, and for policy implementers in practical terms in the field such as the Disaster Preparedness Cadets, in understanding the Minimum Service Standards in the Social Sector.

Good implementation is also evidenced by good resources. The readiness of human resources possessed by the Ministry of Social Affairs, the DKI Jakarta Provincial Social Services Office, and the East Jakarta Social Sub-Department includes personnel that can be mobilized for flood disaster management, ranging from ASN to Non-ASN such as Tagana. The availability of budget for disasters has also been prepared by the Ministry of Social Affairs, the DKI Jakarta Social Services Office, and the East Jakarta Social Sub-Department, although the budget is not specifically for flooding. It should be noted, however, that in regions other.

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